Does Immigration Enforcement Exacerbate Racial/Ethnic Inequality Under the Law?

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Presentation to the Institute for
Research on Poverty
April 24, 2024

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Crimmigration

- Increased coupling of immigration (civil) and criminal legal systems (Stumpf 2006)
- Heightened immigration enforcement at the local level
  - 287(g) programs
  - Criminal Alien Programs (CAP)
  - **Secure Communities Program (S-Comm)**

Secure Communities

- Nationwide local immigration initiative, rolled out at the county-level between 2008-2012.

- Fingerprints taken by local law enforcement at booking are automatically sent to the Department of Homeland Security.

Past Research

Scholars have made broad claims about the racialized nature of immigration enforcement:

- **Kaufman (2018):** "the expansion of immigration policing and the effort to incorporate migration control into the daily work of criminal justice enforcement…allows racial profiling to flourish"

- **Johnson (2016):** "Because the criminal justice system generates racially disparate impacts, the Secure Communities program, which focused on noncitizens caught up in the criminal justice system, also resulted in racially disparate impacts"

Research Questions:

- Using detailed case information on all arrests in California and Texas between 2006 and 2012, we ask:

1) Did the implementation of S-Comm exacerbate ethnic inequalities in arrest?

2) How did S-Comm affect the case processing of ethnic minorities and non-U.S. citizens?

California and Texas

Similarities	Differences

• Two largest immigrant populations in the U.S.
 	
• Both process sizeable populations of non-U.S. citizens through their criminal justice systems.
   • More arrests than the federal government.
 	
• Sites of intense immigration enforcement
	• **Texas** has pursued policies and practices that increase the level of local criminal justice cooperation with immigration authorities.
	   • 287(g) programs (26)
	   • Abolished 'sanctuary' laws
	
	• **California** has sought to decouple their criminal justice system from immigration enforcement
	   • No 287(g) programs
	   • 'Sanctuary' state

Theorizing Immigration Enforcement

S-Comm targeted who? Where?

1. Many jurisdictions did not embrace immigration enforcement.

   • California TRUST Act (2013)

2. Several jurisdictions already had voluntary agreements with ICE (287g)

3. Is "social illegality" applicable?

   • S-Comm was meant to remove ambiguity about immigration status

Theorizing Citizenship and Punishment

S-Comm may alter case processing for *non-U.S. citizens*

1. Altered Incentives

- Noncitizens may take *any* plea to try and exit the system (Cade 2013).
- If already flagged, may see little value in fighting.

2. Pursuit of Deportation

- Legal officials may attempt to ensure that criminal charges result in immigration consequences (Eagly 2013; Stumpf 2013)
    - Incarceration is the most direct way to expose noncitizens

3. Rationale Shifting

- The logic of punishment shifts when local officials anticipate that a defendant faces removal away from reintegration (Aas 2014)

Data & Methods

Universe of arrests in California and Texas from 2006-2012

- Both states statutorily mandate collecting detailed criminal case processing information, from arrest to final disposition for every jailable criminal offense
- Citizenship information

Datasets:

- California data: Criminal Offender Record Information (CORI)
- Texas data: Computerized Criminal History (CCH) system

Data & Methods

- **Difference-in-differences** strategy to leverage the sequential rollout of the program
  - Compare the percent of arrests that involve Hispanic defendants before and after S-Comm at the county-level
  - Compare similarly situated defendants before and after S-Comm implementation

Data & Methods

- ***Stage I: Arrests***
- *Dependent Variables*
  - Inequalities at arrest (county-month analyses)
    - Percent of arrests that are Hispanic

Covariates

287 (g) activation
Violent crime (CORI & CCH)
% Hispanic
Pop. Density
% Noncitizen
% Poverty
County & years fixed effects

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Data & Methods

- ***Stage II: Case Processing***
- *Dependent Variables*
  - Case processing (individual-level analyses)
    - Charged (1=yes)
    - Convicted (1=yes)
    - Incarcerated (1=yes)

Covariates

Arrest statute*	# Prior incarcerations
Number of arrest charges	Race/ethnicity
Felony type (TX)	Sex
# Prior felony arrests	Age
# Prior misdemeanor arrests	County & year indicators

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Results: Stage I

Table 1. Estimating the Percent of Arrests that Involve Hispanics, 2006-2012				
A. Texas	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Focal Measure	All Arrests	Felony Arrests	Misdemeanor Arrests	Traffic Arrests
Secure Communities	-0.008*	-0.010**	-0.008	-0.005
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Number of Cases	19,001	19,001	19,001	19,001
B. California	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Focal Measure	All Arrests	Felony Arrests	Misdemeanor Arrests	Traffic Arrests
Secure Communities	0.001	0.000	0.003	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.010)
Number of Cases	4,704	4,704	4,704	4,704

* p < .05   ** p < .01   *** p < .001. Models are estimated using OLS regression. Standard errors are clustered by county and reported in parentheses. All models include county, month, and year effects, controls for 287(g) implementation, county percent Hispanic, percent noncitizen, violent crime rate, population density, and percent poverty, and are weighted by Hispanic population.

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Number of Cases	19,001	19,001	19,001	19,001
B. California	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Focal Measure	All Arrests	Felony Arrests	Misdemeanor Arrests	Traffic Arrests
Secure Communities	0.001	0.000	0.003	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.010)
Number of Cases	4,704	4,704	4,704	4,704

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Results: Stage II (Latinos)

Table 2. Estimating the Impact of Secure Communities for Hispanics in the Likelihood of Charging, Conviction, Incarceration, and Length of Incarceration, 2006-2012

A. Texas

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Charged	Convicted	Incarcerated
Secure Communities	0.008*	0.012*	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.007)
Hispanic	0.008***	0.052***	0.049***
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Secure Communities x Hispanic	0.001	(0.001)	0.006
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Number of Cases	4,144,616	4,144,616	4,144,616

B. California

	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Charged	Convicted	Incarcerated
Secure Communities	-0.003	-0.002	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Hispanic	-0.010***	0.002	0.015***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Secure Communities x Hispanic	0.000	-0.002	-0.008
	(0.003)	(0.035)	(0.004)
Number of Cases	6,787,439	6,787,439	6,787,439

* p < .05   ** p < .01   *** p < .001.

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Results: Stage II

Table 2. Estimating the Impact of Secure Communities for Hispanics in the Likelihood of Charging, Conviction, Incarceration, and Length of Incarceration, 2006-2012				
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		Charged	Convicted	Incarcerated
Secure Communities		0.008*	0.012*	0.001
		(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.007)
Hispanic		0.008***	0.052***	0.049***
		(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Secure Communities x Hispanic		0.001	0.001	0.006
		(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.006)
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B. California		(5)	(6)	(7)
		Charged	Convicted	Incarcerated
Secure Communities		-0.003	-0.002	0.002
		(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Hispanic		-0.010***	0.002	0.015***
		(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Secure Communities x Hispanic		0.000	-0.002	-0.008
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Hispanic		0.008***	0.052***	0.049***
		(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)
S-Comm x Hispanic		0.001	0.001	0.006
		(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Number of Cases		4,144,616	4,144,616	4,144,616
B. California		(5)	(6)	(7)
		Charged	Convicted	Incarcerated
Secure Communities		-0.003	-0.002	0.002
		(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Hispanic		-0.010***	0.002	0.015***
		(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
S-Comm x Hispanic		0.000	-0.002	-0.008
		(0.003)	(0.035)	(0.004)
Number of Cases		6,787,439	6,787,439	6,787,439

* p < .05   ** p < .01   *** p < .001.

Results: Stage II (non-U.S. Citizens)

Table 3. Estimating the Impact of Secure Communities for Non-U.S. Citizens in the Likelihood of Charging, Conviction, Incarceration, and Length of Incarceration, 2006-2012			
A. Texas	(1)	(2)	(3)
Focal Measures	Charged	Convicted	Incarcerated
Secure Communities	0.008*	0.005	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Non-U.S. Citizen	0.005	0.042***	0.055***
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.012)
S-Comm x Non-U.S. Citizen	-0.004	0.033*	0.047**
	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Number of Cases	4,144,616	4,144,616	4,144,616
B. California	(5)	(6)	(7)
Focal Measures	Charged	Convicted	Incarcerated
Secure Communities	-0.004	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Non-U.S. Citizen	0.013*	0.013**	0.029***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
S-Comm x Non-U.S. Citizen	-0.003	-0.008	-0.011
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Number of Cases	6,787,439	6,787,439	6,787,439

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Results: Stage II (non-U.S. Citizens)

Table 3. Estimating the Impact of Secure Communities for Non-U.S. Citizens in the Likelihood of Charging, Conviction, Incarceration, and Length of Incarceration, 2006-2012

A. Texas	(1)	(2)	(3)
Focal Measures	Charged	Convicted	Incarcerated
Secure Communities	0.008*	0.005	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Non-U.S. Citizen	0.005	0.042***	0.055***
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.012)
S-Comm x Non-U.S. Citizen	-0.004	0.033*	0.047**
	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Number of Cases	4,144,616	4,144,616	4,144,616
B. California	(5)	(6)	(7)
Focal Measures	Charged	Convicted	Incarcerated
Secure Communities	-0.004	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
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	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
S-Comm x Non-U.S. Citizen	-0.003	-0.008	-0.011
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Number of Cases	6,787,439	6,787,439	6,787,439

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

# Results: Stage II (non-U.S. Citizens)

Table 3. Estimating the Impact of Secure Communities for Non-U.S. Citizens in the Likelihood of Charging, Conviction, Incarceration, and Length of Incarceration, 2006-2012

A. Texas		(1)	(2)	(3)
Focal Measures		Charged	Convicted	Incarcerated
Secure Communities		0.008*	0.005	-0.002
		(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Non-U.S. Citizen		0.005	0.042***	0.055***
		(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.012)
S-Comm x Non-U.S. Citizen		-0.004	0.033*	0.047**
		(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Number of Cases		4,144,616	4,144,616	4,144,616
B. California		(5)	(6)	(7)
Focal Measures		Charged	Convicted	Incarcerated
Secure Communities		-0.004	-0.002	-0.001
		(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Non-U.S. Citizen		0.013*	0.013**	0.029***
		(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
S-Comm x Non-U.S. Citizen		-0.003	-0.008	-0.011
		(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Number of Cases		6,787,439	6,787,439	6,787,439

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Results: Stage II (non-U.S. Citizens)

Key Findings

- ## Recalibrates the scope, target, and impact of immigration enforcement.

  - No evidence that ethnic disparities in policing or case processing increased due to S-Comm

  - *After* arrest, S-Comm was highly consequential for non-U.S. citizens, but only in Texas

  - "Social illegality" may be less applicable than previously thought

  - Draws attention to data infrastructure, distinctions between voluntary and involuntary immigration enforcement, and the mechanisms driving noncitizen justice.

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Comments/Questions

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Robustness Checks

1. Did the risk of arrest change after S-Comm?

   – No. Hispanic arrest rates show no effect alone or compared to non-Hispanic Whites.

Appendix Table 7. Estimating the Hispanic Arrest Rate, 2006-2012

A. Texas	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	All	Felony	Misdemeanor	Traffic
Focal Measure	Arrests	Arrests	Arrests	Arrests
Secure Communities	-1.828	-0.362	-1.464	2.916
	(3.37)	(0.734)	(2.972)	(1.973)
Number of Cases	19,001	19,001	19,001	19,001
B. California	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	All	Felony	Misdemeanor	Traffic
Focal Measure	Arrests	Arrests	Arrests	Arrests
Secure Communities	0.234	1.407	-1.173	-0.022
	(3.375)	(1.631)	(2.365)	(0.124)
Number of Cases	4,704	4,704	4,704	4,704

Estimating the Hispanic Arrest Rate / non-Hispanic White Arrest Rate, 2006-2012

C. Texas	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	All	Felony	Misdemeanor	Traffic
Focal Measure	Arrests	Arrests	Arrests	Arrests
Secure Communities	-0.028	-0.052	-0.022	0.015
	(0.032)	(0.065)	(0.023)	(0.035)
Number of Cases	18,538	17,052	18,015	15,912
D. California	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
	All	Felony	Misdemeanor	Traffic
Focal Measure	Arrests	Arrests	Arrests	Arrests
Secure Communities	-0.002	-0.010	0.006	-0.151
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.094)
Number of Cases	4,704	4,704	4,704	4,704

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$.

Robustness Checks

2. Estimation Procedure

- Regressions make strong parametric assumptions

- **Solution**: Exact Matching

Appendix Table 9. Estimating the Differences in the Probability of Incarceration by Citizenship Before and After Secure Communities using Exact Matching in Texas and California, 2006-2012

A. Texas Before Secure Communities	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Focal Measure	Charged	Conviction	Incarceration	Sentence Length
Non-U.S. Citizen	0.013***	0.107***	0.115***	0.117***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Number of Cases	2,156,961	2,156,961	2,156,961	2,156,961
B. Texas After Secure Communities	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Focal Measure	Charged	Conviction	Incarceration	Sentence Length
Non-U.S. Citizen	0.010***	0.145***	0.176***	0.165***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Number of Cases	1,856,210	1,856,210	1,856,210	1,856,210
C. California Before Secure Communities	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Focal Measure	Charged	Conviction	Incarceration	Sentence Length
Non-U.S. Citizen	0.016***	0.021***	0.037***	0.047***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Number of Cases	3,650,679	3,650,679	3,650,679	3,650,679
D. California After Secure Communities	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Focal Measure	Charged	Conviction	Incarceration	Sentence Length
Non-U.S. Citizen	0.012***	0.016***	0.030***	0.045***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Number of Cases	2,416,523	2,416,523	2,416,523	2,416,523

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$. Models estimated using exact matching with the "teffects" command in Stata. Coefficients represent the Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATET). Cases were matched based on their exact values of the following variables: race/ethnicity, gender, categorical age, county, year, truncated prior felony arrests, truncated number of charges, and NCIC offense category. In Texas, cases were additionally matched on offense severity.

Robustness Checks

3. Estimation Procedure

- DiD with time varying treatment
  - Solution: Callaway and Sant'Anna DiD Estimators
    - Arrest models are unchanged
    - Case processing is unwieldy

287(g)

Appendix Table 10. Estimating Changes in the Percent of Arrests involving Hispanics by Arresting Agency in Texas, 2006-2012				
A. Sheriff Departments	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Focal Measure	All Arrests	Felony Arrests	Misdemeanor Arrests	Traffic Arrests
287(g)	0.026**	0.031**	0.027*	0.048**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.016)
Number of Cases	17,990	17,196	17,663	15,305
B. Non-Sheriff Departments	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Focal Measure	All Arrests	Felony Arrests	Misdemeanor Arrests	Traffic Arrests
287(g)	0.014	0.018*	0.012	0.013
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Number of Cases	14,941	14,321	14,802	13,914

* p < .05   ** p < .01   *** p < .001. Models are estimated using OLS regression. Standard errors are clustered by county and reported in parentheses. All models include county, month, and year effects, controls for Secure Communities, county percent Hispanic, percent noncitizen, violent crime rate, population density, and percent poverty, and are weighted by Hispanic population.

Past Research Limitations

Most studies of local immigration enforcement are on a small scale

- Gardner and Kohli (2009) on effect of CAP in Irving, Texas

- Coon (2017) on effect of 287(g) in Frederick County, Maryland

- Beckett and Evans (2015) on effect of S-Comm in King County, Washington

#1 Ethnicity and citizenship

- **Our study:** Uses data from the California Criminal Offender Record Information (CORI) system and the Texas data comes from the Computerized Criminal History (CCH) system.

- Texas Commission on Law Enforcement requires training on the "processing of persons of foreign nationality" during intake interviews to be a licensed jailer.

- Common in California to provide consular service.
  - "Officers shall ask the detained person of his/her foreign national status. If the detained person is a foreign national, the officer should ask the person to identify their country of citizenship and ask the foreign national if he/she would like the appropriate Consular Officer notified." -San Jose PD Manual

#2 After Arrest?

- Much of the immigration enforcement literature focuses on **policing** (Provine et al. 2016; Armenta 2017).

- S-Comm's innovation was to reduce the labor of checking immigration status *after* jail booking.

- Immigration status may be most consequential from the arrest stage forward.

#2 After Arrest?

- **Our study:** Uses linked data that tracks each case from arrest through sentencing

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Arrest → Charging → Conviction → Sentencing
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
#3 National policy?

- The devolution of immigration enforcement to local criminal justice authorities has created a "multijurisdictional patchwork of enforcement policies and practices" (Provine et al. 2016: 3)

Theorizing Immigration Enforcement

S-Comm led to the discriminatory policing and case processing of Latinos

1. History of border enforcement policy
    *   The Undesirable Aliens Act of 1929 (8 U.S.C. §§ 1325-1326)

2. Jurisprudence on race, policing, and border enforcement
    *   The Supreme Court has embedded race as a core investigatory tool in the enforcement of both criminal and immigration law (Johnson 2016) [*Whren v. U.S.* (1996)] [*U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce* (1975)]

3. "Social Illegality"
    *   individuals from Latin America, especially Mexico, are highly suspected of being undocumented (Flores and Schachter 2018)

Empirical Strategy

Stage I: Arrests

$$C_{it} = g(Activate)\delta + X_{it}\beta + \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \alpha_k + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Stage II: Case Processing

$$C_{jit} = g(Activate)\delta +$$

$$\beta_1 noncitizen + \beta_2 noncitizen * Activate + X_{jit}\beta +$$

$$Z_{it}\beta + \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \alpha_k + \varepsilon_{jit}$$

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Immigration Enforcement & Labor Supply:
Hispanic Youth in Mixed-Status Families

Joaquín Alfredo-Angel Rubalcaba [1]
José Bucheli [2]   Camila N. Morales [3]

April, 2024

CONFLUENCE OF CRIMINAL LEGAL & IMMIGRATION SYSTEMS.

ICE Enforcement & Removal Operations- 2019
- 165,487 detainers
- 267,258 removals
- 143,099 administrative arrests

Between 2014 & 2018
- 500,000 deported
  * 97% were Latino
  * 140,000 US-born

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US-Born in Mixed-Status Families (ACS 2019)

	0 to 4	5 to 14	15 to 24
Total US-born	19,027,304	39,683,334	39,246,051
Non-citizen parent(s)	15%	13%	11%
Non-citizen mother	12%	11%	9%
Non-citizen dad	13%	11%	9%
Non-citizen.parent(s)			
Non-citizen sibling	3%	3%	2%

Courtesy: Rubalcaba, Garcia-Perez, Vargas (2021)

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Mixed-Status Family Typology
Vargas & Pirog (2016)

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
Immigration Enforcement & Children of Foreign-Born Parents

- Poverty
  - *Amuedo-Dorantes, Arenas-Arroyo & Sevilla, 2017*

- Academic achievement
  - *Amuedo-Dorantes, & Lopez, 2018*
  - *Bellows, 2019*
  - *Bucheli, Rubalcaba, & Vargas, 2021*

- Social program utilization
  - *Watson, 2014; Alsan & Yang, 2022*

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Immigration Enforcement & the Labor Market

- Labor supply & Wages of Immigrants
  - *Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman, 2022*
  - *East et al., 2021*
  - *Amuedo-Dorantes & Bansk, 2014*
  - *Orrenius & Zavodny, 2015*
  - *Gentsch & Massey, 2011*

- Work Place Safety
  - *Grittner & Johnson, 2021*

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Purpose of this study:

→ *Examine the impact of ICE arrests on the labor supply of US-born Hispanic youth in MSH*

Hypothesis:

→ *U.S.-born Hispanic youth increase labor supply in response to heightened immigration enforcement.*

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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS

We base our analysis on the added-worker effect:

Intensification of immigration enforcement $\Rightarrow$ Decline in labor supply among non-citizen parents (Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak, 2014; East et al., 2022) $\Rightarrow$ Decrease in household income (Amuedo-Dorantes, Arenas-Arroyo and Sevilla, 2018))

An **increase in immigration enforcement**, captured by *unexpected* increase in ICE arrests above the local 6-month trend, **increases the labor supply among US-born Hispanic youth** living in mixed-status households to smooth household income.

Introduction
Data & Methodology
Results
Potential Mechanisms
Conclusion

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EXAMINE THE IMPACT OF ICE ARRESTS ON LABOR SUPPLY AMONG US-BORN HISPANIC YOUTH IN *MSH*

- Extensive & intensive margin
- Current Population Survey: Basic Monthly File
- MSA×month immigration arrest data

PREVIEW OF RESULTS

Increase ("shock") in ICE arrests:
- Labor force participation: $\tau \approx \uparrow 6\% p$
- Hours worked: $\tau \approx \uparrow 15\%$

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DATA

- Immigration Arrests
    - Observation period: 2014 - 2018
    - County×month
- Current Population Survey (CPS): Basic Monthly File
    - Observation period: 2014 - 2018
    - Sample: US-Born 16 to 18 yo. (at least 1 parent).

WHY THE CPS?

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- MSA×month Interior ICE arrests (2014 to 2018)

Legend:
[0,100]
(100,500]
(500,1000]
(1000,2500]
(2500,5000]
(5000,10000]
(10000,20000]
(20000,40000]

THE EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK & IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY

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THE IMPACT OF ARRESTS ON LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES

$$Y_{itm} = \alpha S_{mt} + \eta H_i + \phi P_i + \tau(S_{mt} \cdot H_i \cdot P_i) + \theta_m + \theta_t + \theta_{sy} + X'_{imt}\beta \quad (1)$$

Specification:

Y_{imt} outcome for i, MSA m, & time t

S_{mt}: ICE arrests shock in MSA m & time t.

H_i: Hispanic indicator for respondent.

P_i: Indicator for non-citizen parent.

X_{im}: Individual and household characteristics

θ_m, θ_t, θ_{sy}: Fixed effects

Sample restriction: US-Born respondents 16 to 18 yo., July & August

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PRIMARY RESULTS

Immigration arrests and labor supply (age 16 to 18)

	Labor force participation			Ln(hours worked)		
	(1) All	(2) Women	(3) Men	(4) All	(5) Women	(6) Men
Arrest Shock X Hisp. X Imm. Parents	0.062**	0.079**	0.049	0.152*	0.202*	0.121
	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.042)	(0.088)	(0.116)	(0.114)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fixed Effects						
MSA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-by-Year	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Month-by-Year	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Obs.	120123	57742	62378	120123	57742	62378
Adj R-sq				0.087	0.098	0.092

IDIOSYNCRATIC EVENT ANALYSIS

(a)

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
FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

Increase ("shock") in ICE arrests:

- Labor force participation: $\tau \approx \uparrow 6\%p$

$$\tau_{Women} \approx \uparrow 8\%p \text{ or } \uparrow 27\%$$

- Hours worked: $\tau \approx \uparrow 15\%$

$$\tau_{Women} \approx \uparrow 20\%$$

- Change in labor supply as response to ICE arrests likely attributable to a reduction in labor supply among non-citizen parents as opposed to an increase in labor market opportunities or wages for adolescent youth, more broadly.

- Effects observed during a crucial period of human capital accumulation can have long-term real economic consequences.

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SITUATING OUR CONTRIBUTIONS

1. (Un)intended consequence of immigration enforcement
   $\rightarrow$ U.S.-born children

2. The direct and contemporaneous measure of enforcement
   $\rightarrow$ Advancing beyond underlying immigration policies

3. An underlying mechanism for the added worker effect
   $\rightarrow$ Δlabor supply of US-born

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THANK YOU!

JOAQUIN ALFREDO-ANGEL RUBALCABA
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Engage and Evade

How Latino Immigrant Families Manage Surveillance in Everyday Life

Asad L. Asad
Assistant Professor of Sociology
Stanford University

April 24, 2024

Research Questions
Surveillance as Risk and Reward?

- How do undocumented immigrants understand and experience institutional surveillance?

- How do these understandings and experiences inform their engagement with institutional authorities?

- To what extent does institutional surveillance facilitate or undermine their short- and long-term societal membership, and how?

Princeton University Press (2023)

Data and Methods
Iterative, Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis

Earle Cabell Federal Building (Dallas Immigration Court), 2015

Data and Methods
Iterative, Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis

- In-depth Interviews in Dallas County, Texas (2013-2018)

  - 28 Latino immigrant families with 60 adults (5 U.S.-born) and 100 children (97 U.S.-born)

  - Among immigrants: 35 undocumented, 4 semi-legal, 12 permanent residents, 4 naturalized

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Selective Engagement with Surveilling Institutions

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- People, including undocumented immigrants, weigh short-term risks and rewards of everyday surveillance

- **But**: undocumented immigrants must weigh these against long-term risks and rewards of immigration surveillance (e.g., deportation or legalization)

Correlated Adversities
Undocumented, Racialized, and Poor

- **Legal status frames undocumented immigrants' socioeconomic opportunities**:

  - Eduardo, 20 years in U.S.: "No one in this country pays us a lot. You can find work, but you're not going to earn as much as someone who is from here. […] We come here and give it our all. We struggle. We suffer. And we get no help from anyone."

  - Alejandra, 16 years in U.S.: "We take advantage of good weather and save for when it turns bad so we can have money then. […] And, when the cold sets in, you use what you've saved…. Some people say I'm very cheap, but that's not being cheap—that's knowing how to save because when you don't have money where will you get it from? How will you live without money?"

  - Samuel, 19 years in U.S.: "You can get *papeles chuecos* [fake identity documents] like me, but you know they're not secure. […] You have to be OK with what you have. But you do still dream of more, of not living day to day, you know?"

5

Parenting Amid Adversities
Conflicting Social Roles and Responsibilities

- **Parenthood as gateway to engagement with service institutions:**

  - Norma, 18 years in U.S.: "They told me that they would help the kids, because they are children who were born here. But not me and Pablo because we do not qualify for that."

  - Natalia, 16 years in U.S.: "Before they were born, I was at the clinic, and they had me fill out some paperwork. They told me that they would cover my bills while pregnant and, once the kids were born, they would be covered."

Parenting Amid Adversities
Conflicting Social Roles and Responsibilities

- **Undocumented immigrants sensitive to "burdening" government but material needs of children come first:**

  - Adriana, 21 years in U.S.: "Many people say you shouldn't ask for help…. But if the children were born here, they have a right to health insurance. And thank God they get it. I even signed them up for food assistance. Because I'm not rich. The children need health insurance. Imagine what would happen if they got sick. Or didn't have enough to eat. How would I pay for their medical expenses? How would I pay for their doctors' visits when I take them for their checkups? How am I supposed to pay for their food?"

    "I hear people say it will affect me if the government lets us fix our documents one day. I don't know if they want to scare us or are trying to warn people, if it's true or a lie… But there is no time to stop and worry…. The children were born here, and it's my job to take care of them however I can."

Parenting Amid Adversities
Conflicting Social Roles and Responsibilities

- **Fears of being labeled a "public charge" and a "bad parent":**

  - Pedro, 23 years in U.S.: "If I don't take my kids to the doctor or send them to school, the police come for them."

    "I still hope to get my papers, and many people say I shouldn't apply for my kids because then the government won't give me papers. But they would have given me papers by now if they were going to do that. Besides, none of this help is for us; it's for our girls."

    "There are no laws against us getting these things for our kids."

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- People worried about punishment align institutional engagement with perceived expectations of authorities who regularly surveil them (e.g., police officers, employers, doctors, teachers, and social workers)

- Testable implication: relative to Latino U.S. citizens, Latino noncitizens vulnerable to immigration enforcement should exhibit lower rates of institutional involvement on their own behalf but similar rates on behalf of their children

Results from ATUS
Estimates of Latinos' Personal Involvement in Surveilling Institutions

Percent Involved

100

80

60

56.6

53.2

*

40

20

0

U.S.-born   Noncitizen

Year-adjusted

Citizenship

p < 0.05 [indicating statistical difference from U.S.-born citizen category]

Source: Asad analysis of IPUMS-ATUS

Results from ATUS
## *Estimates of Latinos' Personal Involvement in Surveilling Institutions*

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Results from ATUS
Fully-adjusted Estimates of Latinos' Involvement in Surveilling Institutions, Parents Only


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Source: Asad analysis of IPUMS-ATUS

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Results from ATUS

Fully-adjusted Estimates of Latinos' Involvement in Surveilling Institutions, Parents Only

Percent Involved (y-axis: 0, 20, 40, 60, 80, 100)

- U.S.-born: 55.4
- Noncitizen: 52.3 *
- **Personal**
- U.S.-born: 61.7
- Noncitizen: 59.5
- **+Kids**

Citizenship

* p < 0.05 [indicating statistical difference from U.S.-born citizen category]

Source: Asad analysis of IPUMS-ATUS

11

Results from ATUS
Fully-adjusted Estimates of Latinos' Involvement in Surveilling Institutions, Non-parents Only

* p < 0.05 [indicating statistical difference from U.S.-born citizen category]
Source: Asad analysis of IPUMS-ATUS

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Theoretical Implications
Surveillance as Punishment and Reward

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- Institutional inclusion is an inequality-generating (-reflecting) process

  - Engagement with surveilling institutions emerges out of coercion (Foucault 2007 [1977])

Policy Implications
Possibilities and Limitations of Categorical Inclusion

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• How can the United States move from having 10.5 million undocumented immigrants to zero?

Policy Implications
Possibilities and Limitations of Categorical Inclusion

- How can the United States move from having 10.5 million undocumented immigrants to zero?

  - **Immigration Surveillance**: visa allocations and distributions; lower administrative burden on new and renewing visa applicants (e.g., automatic fee waivers, expand Visa Waiver Program, eliminate expiration dates); legalization and naturalization programs; right to public defender in immigration court; independent immigration court

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Policy Implications
## Possibilities and Limitations of Categorical Inclusion

- ~~How can the United States move from having 10.5 million undocumented immigrants to zero?~~

- How can the United States limit the categorical inequalities imposed upon the undocumented population?

Policy Implications
Possibilities and Limitations of Categorical Inclusion

- ~~How can the United States move from having 10.5 million undocumented immigrants to zero?~~

- How can the United States limit the categorical inequalities imposed upon the undocumented population?

  - **Everyday Surveillance**: federal sanctuary policy to limit federal-local law enforcement collaborations; decriminalizing undocumented immigration; restore definition of aggravated felony to its original meaning; reinstate criminal judges' authority to advise against deportation; invest in holistic defense; restore undocumented immigrants' right to a social security number; grant right to federal driver's license; remove citizenship and legal status as requirements for accessing service institutions; rescind public charge rule; allow undocumented immigrants to buy into Affordable Care Act; guarantee right to public education through college

Thank you!

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Stanford University
Email: asadasad@stanford.edu
Twitter: @asasad